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JUSTICE RUTLEDGE ON STATE TAXATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
LANDON G. ROCKWELL*
With the sudden passing of Justice Rutledge the Supreme Court lost
not only one of its staunchest defenders of civil liberties but also its
most articulate member on issues of state taxation of interstate com-
merce. His views on civil liberties were shared, in varying degrees, by
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy. But from 1946 to the time of
his death he was the sole consistent advocate of an approach to issues
of state taxation of interstate commerce once shared by a majority.
Justice Rutledge regarded these issues as essentially a problem of
federalism. The elastic framework of American federalism assures
judges a perpetual task in reconciling competing demands of power.
In this task, as in most problems of constitutional interpretation, the
values to which a judge subscribes are ultimately decisive. In Justice
Rutledge's scheme of constitutional values the federal system was the'
unique institutional core of American democracy. Civil liberties, of
course, occupied an unquestioned preferred place in his hierarchy of
values and for this he will probably be best remembered." But to fed-
eralism he also assigned a high place. It provided an accommodation
between the integration and diversity essential for a viable democratic
society. He regarded the commerce clause as the chief instrument in
this task. In this process of accommodation he thought the states must
be conceded power to meet their needs short of impeding the currents
of a continental economy. Therefore as much leeway as practicable
should be allowed for the play of local economic authority in the fed-
eral scheme. To Justice Rutledge the Constitution enjoined both this
and rigid protection of civil liberties as essential safeguards against a
Leviathan which smothers individuality. In no area of constitutional
interpretation did he express himself so vigorously or distinctively as
in issues concerning the rights of persons and the contentious water-
shed of federalism reflected in cases on state taxation of interstate
commerce.
Protection of civil liberties was for him very nearly an absolute gen-
eral principle, derived a priori from the basic premises of democracy.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College.
1, See Rockwell, Justice Rutledge on Civil Liberties, 59 YALS L. J. 27 (1949).
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In hewing out the lines of federalism in the problem of state taxation
of interstate commerce, however, his intellectual method was strictly
pragmatic. This followed from an ungrudging recognition of the neces-
sity for very broad federal power under the commerce clause in order
to meet the internal and external needs of a giant industrial nation.
The federal power cannot be bounded by a fixed line since "it is as
broad as the economic needs of the nation." Therefore state power
must accommodate itself to these needs as they develop. But insofar
as it was consistent with those needs and practicable, he believed that
the demands of federalism required deference to state power. The ra-
tionalizing principle here was therefore a thoroughly pragmatic one.
In his little volume, A Declaration of Legal Faith, Justice Rutledge
referred to the commerce clause as "a chapter in democratic living."
He thought it "one of the foundations of democratic institutions" be-
cause it is "inherently a federal device" and federalism "by its very
division of powers creates a safeguard perhaps not otherwise attainable
against wholly autocratic action."' Since positive federal power under
the commerce clause reached its maximum current scope by about 19412
Justice Rutledge had little opportunity to contribute to this phase of
accommodating the clause to twentieth century federalism. But the
extent of the restrictions inferentially imposed on state power by the
commerce clause has been quite another matter. On this problem
of federalism as posed by issues of state taxation of interstate com-
merce Justice Rutledge was the most articulate member of the Supreme
Court during the past six years.
Issues of federalism are a dime a dozen in constitutional questions
but one of the most perplexing ones to confront the Court in recent
years has been that of state taxation of interstate commerce. The judi-
cial search for some pattern of consistent criteria by which to test in-
creasing state activity in this area has been singularly involved, oscil-
lating, and without benefit of notable agreement. Justice Rutledge
came to the Court at an approximate midpoint of the flux of recent
developments. During the six years prior to his appointment, new
doctrine had been evolved in a number of important cases.a
The "subject matter" approach wherein the test of state power was
1 RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION or LEGAL FAiTH 76 (1947).
2 E.g., U. S. v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100 (1941).
3 E.g., Western Livestock v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938);
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); Gwinn, White and Prince v. Henneford,
305 U. S. 434 (1939); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33
(1940).
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whether a tax was levied on a local rather than a predominantly inter-
state activity had been largely abandoned.4 In the face of vastly in-
creased efforts of the states to tap new sources of revenue during the
depression years the Court, under the aegis of Justice Stone, advanced
new criteria based primarily on an examination of the economic facts.
The evolution of this new doctrine, the multiple burden test, beginning
with Western Livestock v. Bureau of Internal Revenue5 in 1938, and
culminating with McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. in
1940 was rapid, complex, and quite in keeping with the dynamism of
the early Roosevelt Court.6 Professor Powell has commented that in
the weeks prior to the Western Live Stock decision "there had apparent-
ly been a journey along the intellectual road to Damascus with illumina-
tion along the way."'1
The multiple burden test greatly burdened the permissible area of
state taxation of interstate commerce. Broadly speaking, by means of
this new standard the Court affirmed the right of the states to require
interstate commerce to pay its way in competition with local activity
provided that taxation did not result in multiple tax burdens on inter-
state commerce to which local activity was not exposed.' Apparently
4 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887), for example,
which asserted: "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same
amount of tax should be levied on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on
solely within state." This rule was initially adopted by the Court in the Case of the
State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (1873).
5 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
6 For various analyses of this and earlier developments in this field, see RIBBLE,
STATE AND NATIONAL PowER ovER COmmERCE (1937); Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes
on Interstate Transactions, 47 CoL. L. REv. 211 (1947) ; Hellerstein, State Franchise
Taxation of Interstate Business, 8 LAWYERS GuiDL REv. 429 (1948); Lockhart, The
Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HARv. L. Rxv. 617 (1939); Lockhart, State Tax
Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HAmv. L. REv. 1253 (1940); Lockhart, Gross Receipts
Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Communication, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 40 (1943);
Morrison, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 35 ILL. L. REV. 727 (1942); Overton,
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 19 TENN. L. REv. 870 (1947); Powell, State Income
Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 31 YALE L. J. 799 (1922); Powell, New Light on
Gross Receipts Taxes, 53 HARv. L. Rnv. 909 (1940); Powell, More Ado about Gross
Receipts Taxes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 501, 710 (1947); Traynor, State Taxation and the Com-
merce Clause in the Supreme Court 1938 Term, 28 CAL. L. REv. 168 (1940).
7 60 HARv. L. REV. 516 (1947).
8 Justice Stone expounded the multiple burden test in the Western Live Stock case
as follows: ". . . the vice characteristic of [taxes] which have been held invalid is that
they have placed on commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable, in point of
substance, of being imposed . . . or added to . . . with equal right by every state which
commerce touches merely because interstate commerce is being done, so that without
the protection of the commerce clause, it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on
local commerce . . ." 303 U. S. 250, 255 (1938).
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henceforth the Court would not approve taxes on interstate business
when the taxes were apportioned in a manner reasonably to measure
the taxing state's fair interest in the business activity involved. Appor-
tionment was thus an important corollary to the multiple tax burden
doctrine. This pragmatic approach to the problem initiated in the
Western Live Stock decision was further buttressed by the requirement
that state tax levies on interstate commerce neither operate extra-terri-
torially as to out-of-state goods or transactions nor discriminate against
interstate commerce vis a vis local commerce.
Thus, as matters stood in 1940 when the Berwind-White opinion
crystallized the most recent developments prior to Justice Rutledge's
appointment, 0 the comprehensive test of state power to tax interstate
commerce was whether or not a given tax imposed a heavier burden
on interstate commerce than on local commerce. Under this doctrine
the dominant view of the preceding fifty years that under the commerce
clause the subject matter of interstate commerce may not be taxed at
all by the states was rejected.
At the same time two distinct minority views had been pressed with-
out success by members of the present court. On the one hand, Jus-
tices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas in a striking dissent in 1940
proposed what has since become known as the "leave it to Congress"
theory."1 Maintaining that the protection of interstate commerce from
state legislation must come from Congress rather than the Court, the
opinion advocated a restrained role for the judiciary: "This Court has
but a limited responsibility in that state legislation may here be chal-
9 A triple rule against discrimination, multiple tax burdens, and extra-territoriality was
laid down in Gwinn, White and Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 307 (1938). The clearest
statement of the discrimination rule is to be found in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co.:
"Certain types of tax may, if permitted at all, so readily be made the instrument of
impeding or destroying interstate commerce as plainly to call for their condemnation as
forbidden regulations. Such are the taxes . . . which are aimed at or discriminate against
the commerce or impose a levy for the privilege of doing it, or tax interstate transporta-
tion or communication or their gross earnings, or levy an exaction on merchandise in the
course of its interstate journeys. Each imposes a burden which intrastate commerce does
not bear, and merely because interstate commerce is being done places it at a dis-
advantage with intrastate business or property . . ." 309 U. S. 33, 48 (1940).
These three pragmatic limitations on state power to tax interstate commerce are, of
course, closely inter-related; a tax which operates extra-territorially is a special form
of discrimination against interstate commerce; similarly t6xes imposing a multiple
burden on interstate commerce without imposing the same burden on local commerce
would discriminate against the former.
10 For a close analysis of the Berwind-White case, see Powell, New Light on Gross
Receipts Taxes, 53 HARv. L. REV. 909 (1940).
11 McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176 (1940).
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lenged if it discriminates against that interstate commerce or is hostile
to the congressional grant of authority."' Justice Frankfurter, how-
ever, after initially protesting excessive limitation of state power, 3
by 1946 came to accept the idea that commerce required substantial
protection.14 On the other hand, Justice Jackson has believed all along
that the protection of the national economy is a major historical respon-
sibility of the Court. For him, congressional silence does not give con-
sent for state legislatures to meddle with interstate commerce. Of the
"leave it to Congress" theory, he remarked in 1941:
... the practical result is that in default of action by us they [the states]
will go on suffocating and retarding and Balkanizing American commerce,
trade, and industry .... I differ basically from my brethren as to whether
the inertia of government shall be on the side of restraint of commerce
or on the side of freedom of commerce. . . . I am reluctant to see any
new local systems for restraining our national commerce get the prestige
and power of established institutions.
This, he added, "is a trend with which I will have no part." 5 Rather
consistently he has had no part in it.
Such was the judicial climate of opinion in this area of constitutional
law when Justice Rutledge joined the Court. Three broad alternatives
were available. At one extreme was the pre-1938 view that the very
existence of the commerce clause forbade the states to tax interstate
commerce at all. At the other extreme was the view, never embraced
by a majority of the Court, that the states generally may tax interstate
commerce until Congress tells them they can't. Between these two
extremes was the multiple burden test. Justice Rutledge consistently
adhered to this compromise alternative. Since 1946, however, a ma-
jority of the Court has substantially abandoned it.
Fourteen cases between May, 1944, and June, 1949, afforded Justice
Rutledge an opportunity to state his position. This he did at some
length in nine opinions-more than any of the other Justices produced
in these cases.' 6 Three separate opinions and one majority opinion con-
12 309 U. S. 176, 184 (1940). This view was initially propounded by Justice Black
during his first two years on the Court. It has continued to be his position, shared
substantially by Justices Douglas and Murphy. See Black, dissenting, in J. D. Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 327 (1938), and Gwinn, White and Prince v. Henne-
ford, 305 U. S. 434, 454-455 (1939).
18 In addition to his dissent in the McCarroll case, see also his opinion in Wisconsin
v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940), quoted in part in note 23, infra.
'4 See discussion of Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946), infra.
15 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 391, 400-420 (1941), dissenting opinion.
16 Four were for the majority; five were separate opinions.
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tain the substance of his views.17 His agreement with two dissenting
opinions offers some further clarification.
The much litigated Indiana gross receipts tax of 1933 provided him
with an opportunity to present his views at length in Freeman v.
Hewit.' The case was argued in November, 1944, but since no agree-
ment apparently was reached it was scheduled for reargument. This
was done in November, 1946, and the decision handed down in mid-
December. One might infer from this that the Court desired to re-
examine its basic premises in this area. The inference is not belied by
the opinions. Further, there is evidence that Justice Rutledge individu-
ally was interested in a careful re-exploration of this judicial chambered
nautilus. Two weeks before the decision in Freeman v. HeWt was
handed down he delivered a series of lectures at the University of
Kansas. Discussing recent judicial trends concerning the commerce
clause as a limitation on state power, he observed:
Dogma and formulae, reflecting the certitude of earlier swings in policy
continue to appear. Practical considerations and outworn theories at times
remain commingled, so as to obscure, if not quite conceal, underlying
conflicts of theory and policy concerning the negation's proper scope
and application. The resulting pattern, if not kaleidoscopic, still affords
highly convenient variables for decision in specific controversies. More
often than might be expected from such a footing, reconcilable results
have been secured. But rationalization which straddles conflict or ignores
it leads eventually to irreconcilable results and thus to necessity for re-
formulating reasoning.19
He seized the opportunity for "reformulating reasoning" in Freeman
v. Hewit.
The case involved the application of the tax to receipts of gross in-
come by domiciliaries of the state. The receipts in question were pro-
ceeds of a sale of securities on the New York stock exchange. Justice
Frankfurter condemned the tax for the majority in language which
17 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U. S. 335 (1944);
McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944); and International Harvester Co. v.
Treasury Dept., 322 U. S. 340 (1944). Justice Rutledge wrote one separate opinion with
reference to all three cases at 322 U. S. 349. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946),
concurring opinion; Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948), concurring
opinion. The majority opinion referred to is Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946).
The other five opinions add little of significance. They appear in the following cases:
majority opinion in Independent Warehouse, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70 (1947) ; Aero-
Mayflower Transit Co. v. R. R. Commissioners, 332 U. S. 495 (1947); Interstate Oil
Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 93 L. Ed. 1163 (1949); concurring opinion in International
Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 423 (1947); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385,
409 (1948).
18 329 U. S. 249 (1946).
19 RVTLEDGE, A DEcLAaRA7io oF LEGAL FAnrH 69 (1947).
[Vol. 3 5
RUTLEDGE ON STATE TAXATION
elicited Justice Rutledge's twenty-five page concurring opinion.20  The
majority opinion is notable for its virtual abandonment of the multiple
burden test and reaffirmation of the old subject-matter approach domi-
nant prior to 1938. There had been previous signs of Justice Frank-
furter's dissatisfaction with the approach to state taxation of interstate
commerce developed by Justice Stone and to the position he himself had
taken in the McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines dissent.2 ' In Freeman
v. Hewit he led a majority of five for the first time to overrule the
late Chief Justice's rationale. The Constitution forbids this levy, the
opinion holds, because it is "a direct tax on interstate sales." Thus
"what makes the tax invalid is the fact that there is interference by a
State with the freedom of interstate commerce . . . a direct imposition
on that very freedom of commercial flow which ... has been the ward
of the Commerce Clause." Thus the old subject-matter test again
prevailed. The discrimination test applied in recent cases is rejected
with the admonition that "so to argue is to disregard the life of the
Commerce Clause." The multiple burden rule is similarly discarded as
"irrelevant to the kind of freedom of trade which the commerce clause
generated." That kind of freedom, the opinion asserts, cannot tolerate
"what amounts to a levy upon the very process of commerce across
state lines." Nor can the Court "support the notion that a State may
be allowed one single-tax-worth of direct interference with the free flow
of commerce. ' 22 Formulations of new tests in recent cases are referred
to as "an exercise in the logic of empty categories" and "a fashion in
judicial writing.121
Justice Rutledge protested vigorously against this judicial atavism,
20 Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissented; Justice Black, without opinion.
Justice Douglas wrote a brief dissent in which Justice Murphy joined.
21 See Justice Frankfurter's opinions in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S.
292 (1944) and McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
22 Italics added.
23 Justice Frankfurter himself succumbed to that "fashion in judicial writing" six
years earlier. Compare these statements with his own condemnation of the pre-1938
formalistic approach in a 1940 case: "The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not
demand of states strict observance of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing
in their exercise of the most basic power of government-that of taxation. . . . A state
is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the
practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities
which it has given, to protection it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the
fact of being an orderly, civilized society. . . . We must be on guard against imprisoning
the taxing power of the states within the formulas that are not compelled by the Con-
stitution but merely represent judicial generalizations exceeding the concrete circumstances
which they profess to summarize." Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435,
444-445 (1940).
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while concurring in the result. "This is a case in which the grounding
of the decision is more important than the decision itself. . . .The
matter is of large importance and calls for discussion." He examined
at length the task of establishing an area of immunity from state taxa-
tion. He then presented his own formulations. For him, the infirmity
of the tax was to be found in the possibility of multiple taxation (since
New York is also free to tax the transaction), and not because it is "a
direct tax on interstate sales." The "reversion" of the majority "to
ideas once prevalent, but long since repudiated" ignores-the design of
the commerce clause.
The commerce clause was not designed or intended to outlaw all state
taxes bearing "directly" on interstate commerce. Its design was only to
exclude those having the effects to block or impede it which called it and
the Constitution itself into being.... 24 Unless we are to return to the for-
malism of another day, neither the "directness" of the incidence of a tax
"upon the commerce itself" nor the fact that its incidence is manipu-
lated to rest upon some "local incident" of the interstate transaction can
be used as a criterion or, many times, as a consideration of first importance
in determining the validity of a state tax bearing upon or affecting inter-
state commerce .... 25 judgments of this character and magnitude cannot
be made by labels and formulae. They require much more than point-
ing to a word. It is for this reason that increasingly with the years em-
phasis has been placed upon practical consequences and effects, either
actual or threatened, of questioned legislation to block or impede inter-
state commerce or place it at practical disadvantage with local trade...
and the trend of recent decisions to sustain taxes formerly regarded as
invalid has been due in large part to this fact.26
Although he was primarily worried about the grounds of justice
Frankfurter's opinion, justice Rutledge was also worried about the
possibility of multiple taxation of the proceeds of Mr. Freeman's inter-
state sale. To that question he addressed the latter half of his opinion.
In this case, the state of origin, Indiana, had taxed the proceeds of the
sale. New York had not, but could. Hence a potential multiple tax
burden existed. The majority forestalled this by voiding the Indiana
tax, but without reference to the multiple burden issue. Although the
bare unexercised power of another state to tax does not produce a cu-
mulative tax burden, it opens the door to it-a door which justice
Rutledge wanted closed at a time when new sources of revenue were
being sought. He had objected to this closed door policy, which he now
24 329 U. S. 249, 270 (1946).
2 Id. at 269.
26 Id. at 270. See note 13 in the concurring opinion, 329 U. S. 249, 265, for a catalogue
of cases involving gross receipts taxes which have been sustained or invalidated on grounds
other than the "direct" incidence of the tax on interstate commerce itself.
[Vol. 35
RUTLEDGE ON STATE TAXATION
deemed necessary, when' the majority espoused it because of a similar
potential multiple tax burden in McLeod v. Dilworth. 7 In that case he
argued that if it were necessary to choose between the taxing power of
the state of market and the state of origin, he would prefer the former.
There the majority had closed the door on the state of market because
the door was open to the state of origin. At least that was the implica-
tion according to Justice Rutledge's reading of the opinion. He would
have upheld the tax by the state of market-the existence of a potential
multiple tax burden notwithstanding. In the present case the situation
was exactly reversed: the state of origin has taxed; the state of market
may tax. This time Justice Rutledge did not like the potential multiple
tax situation. It lures tax-thirsty states. Confusion and expensive liti-
gation follow.
Within the frame of reference of the multiple burden test, he saw
three alternative methods of protecting interstate commerce from the
grasp of more than one state tax collector without creating a total im-
munity for it. They are: (1) to forbid either the state of origin or the
state of the market to tax unless the tax is apportioned, thus elimi-
nating the cumulative burden;28 (2) to rule that either the state of
origin or the state of market, but not both, can tax; (3) to- determine
factually in each case whether application of the tax can be made by
one state without incurring danger of its being made in another. An
examination of these~alternatives led Justice Rutledge to the conclusion
that no ideal solution exists. The choice was therefore among evils.
His own preference was the second alternative29 subject to power in the
state of origin also to tax by allowing credit to the full amount
of any tax paid or due at destination. This credit provision Justice
Rutledge regarded as a form of apportionment. Since there was
no provision for apportionment or credit in the Indiana tax he con-
cluded it must fall, since a multiple tax burden threatened should New
York exercise its power to tax the transaction also.
His shift in position on this question of a potential multiple tax
burden is foreshadowed, inferentially, by his remark in the University
of Kansas lectures that "rationalization which straddles conflict or
ignores it leads eventually to irreconcilable results and thus to the
necessity for reformulating reasoning."
These are the main themes of Justice Rutledge's position on this
27 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
28 This is, in substance, the ruling of J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307
(1938).
29 This he proposed in his dissent in McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 361 (1944).
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knotty question of state taxation of interstate commerce. For him the
test of state power derived from the concrete economic consequences
of taxation, not from conceptions deduced from the commerce clause.
For the commerce clause itself merely prescribes a technique by which
concrete economic problems are to be resolved in the federal scheme.
Thus in 1944 he argued that the economic effect on interstate com-
merce of a use tax and a sales tax was virtually identical. He thought
them both permissible. That the Court sustained one and invalidated
the other on the basis of what the minority regarded as sophisticated
legal distinctions-almost on the basis of nomenclature-reflects the
degree of technical ramification which has invaded the field in recent
years. The first, General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of
Iowa,0 involved a use tax levied by Iowa on goods sold to Iowa by a
non-resident vendor who solicited orders in Iowa for goods to be shipped
from a Minnesota concern. Writing for the majority, Justice Frank-
furter upheld the tax as a non-discriminatory excise laid on all per-
sonal property consumed in Iowa. The other case, McLeod v. Dilworth
Co.,31 embraced virtually the same factual situation except that the
tax imposed this time by Arkansas was construed as a sales tax, and
was levied on a transaction consummated in Tennessee, although the
orders for the goods shipped to Arkansas residents had been solicited
by the Tennessee vendor within the jurisdiction of Arkansas. Since
title passed with shipment in Tennessee, and no collections were made
in Arkansas, the Court ruled, again speaking through Justice Frank-
furter, that the incidence of this sales tax was extra-state. It was
thus held invalid as a tax on interstate sale. Relying on the fact that
the sales transaction was completed outside the taxing state, the Court
distinguished this tax from the sales tax which it upheld in McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. on the ground that the out-of-state
seller there completed his sales in an office within the taxing state.
Here, since legal transfer of ownership took place in Tennessee, for
Arkansas to impose a tax on the transaction would be to project its
powers beyond its boundaries and tax an interstate transaction. Further,
in order to demonstrate the rather tenuous disparity between the
General Trading Co. use tax and the Dilworth sales tax the Court dis-
tinguished between use and sales taxes. "A sales tax and a use tax in
many instances may bring about the same result. But they are differ-
ent in conception, are assessments upon different transactions, and in
30 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
31 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
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the interlacings of the two legislative authorities within our federation
may have to justify themselves on different constitutional grounds." 32
Justice Rutledge disagreed with these distinctions in a separate
opinion33 which reflects at length on the issues raised in these two cases
and one other 3 4 Concurring in the use tax decision, he dissented from
the sales tax decision because "for constitutional purposes" he failed
to see any difference "but one of words and scope" between the two
taxes. He thought that the legal arguments relied on by the majority
failed to distinguish the two taxes adequately on economic grounds.
Neither [tax] lays a greater burden on the interstate business involved
than it does on wholly intrastate business of the same sort. Neither segre-
gates the interstate transactions for separate or special treatment. In
both cases the sellers are non-residents of the taxing state .... In the face
of such identities it is hard to see how one tax can be upheld and the
other voided. Surely the state's power to tax is not to turn on the tech-
nical legal effect ...that "title passes" on delivery to the carrier in
Memphis. . . .In the absence of other and more substantial difference,
that irrelevant technical consideration should not control.35
The majority's distinction between "use" and "sales" taxes did not
impress Justice Rutledge. The difference in "conception" emphasized
by Justice Frankfurter, in Justice Rutledge's view could hardly detdr-
mine whether the power to levy such taxes existed. "Other things being
the same, constitutionality should not turn on- whether one name or
the other is applied by the state.""0
Assuming the desirability of defining state powers of taxation insofar
as practicable, he suggested the formula which he reiterated two years
later in Freeman v. Heut: if it is necessary to choose between the
power of the state of origin and that of the state of market to tax and
32 322 U. S. 327, 330 (1944).
33 322 U. S. 349 (1944).
34 The third case is International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340
(1944), in which justice Rutledge concurred. Justice Jackson was the lone dissenter.
This case involved the application of an Indiana gross receipts tax to three types of
sales made by the International Harvester Co. which had several branches in the state.
The gross-receipts tax was treated as the equivalent of sales tax. Taxes on all the sales
were upheld on the grounds that a state may tax the gross receipts from interstate trans-
actions consummated within its borders where it treats wholly local transactions the
same way, as it did in this case.
35 The question of whether the title passes in the state of origin of the goods or the
state of market had previously not been thought controlling. Caldwell v. North Carolina,
187 U. S. 622 (1908). Justice Stone ignored the point in the Berwind-White case, and
Chief justice Hughes dissenting in the same case commented that "the place where the
title passes has not been regarded as the test of the interstate character of a sale." 309
U. S. 33, 64 (1940).
36 322 U. S. 340, 353 (1944).
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allowing credit in order to avoid a multiple tax burden, the choice
should be made in favor of the state of market or consumption. This
is preferable because a tax imposed by the state of market is the one
most certain to place the same tax load on both the interstate and com-
peting local business.
Early in 1947, a majority of five in Joseph v. Carter and Weekes
Stevedoring Co.13 7 with hardly a nod to the multiple burden or dis-
crimination tests, reaffirmed a decision of 193738 which struck down
an unapportioned gross receipts tax on the business of a stevedoring
company engaged in loading and unloading vessels employed in inter-
state and foreign commerce. After the fashion of the opinion in Free-
man v. Hewit a year earlier this revived the pre-1938 subject-matter
test-that the subject matter of interstate commerce, per se, was be-
yond the reach of the long arm of state tax collectors-since stevedor-
ing was held to be a part of interstate commerce. Therefore the tax
was on interstate commerce. Justice Rutledge concurred in a dissent-
ing opinion written by Justice Douglas39 which points out that accord-
ing to recent doctrine the vice of unapportioned gross receipts taxes
is the danger of multiplication and duplication. Against the view of
the majority which seems to find a "burden" on interstate commerce
simply because the tax is "on" such commerce, the dissenting opinion
argues that no risk of multiple tax burdens is present since the receipts
taxed cannot be reached by other states. Nor was apportionment of
receipts from transactions wholly carried on within the taxing juris-
diction necessary, since, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, "gross
receipts reflect values attributable to the business or property wholly
within the taxing state."40 The reliance by the majority on the subject
matter test at the expense of the multiple burden theory impelled Jus-
tice Douglas to conclude his opinion with the lament that "the failure
of the Court to adhere to the philosophy of our recent cases corrobo-
rates the impression which some of us had that Freeman v. Hewit ...
marked the end of one cycle under the Commerce Clause and the be-
ginning of another."41
In the light of his concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, Justice
Rutledge's alignment with the dissenting opinion in the stevedoring
37 330 U. S. 422 (1947).
38 Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commissioner, 302 U. S. 90 (1937).
39 As did Justice Murphy. Justice Black dissented without opinion and without join-.
ing the dissenting opinion.
40 330 U. S. 422, 438 (1947).
41 Id. at 444.
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case clearly indicated that he was committed to following the prag-
matic approach developed by Justice Stone. Consistent with that, he
insisted on some kind of apportioning device to protect interstate com-
merce from an actual or potential multiple tax burden or any other
kind of discrimination in relation to local commerce.
In Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,4' a majority of five upheld a
Mississippi franchise tax on that portion of an interstate natural gas
pipeline company's lines which passed through the state, although the
company did no business there. The tax was measured by the value of
the capital used or invested within the state. The issue thus presented
required over six months between argument and decision to produce
three opinions, in none of which did a majority of the Court concur. 3
Justice Reed's opinion sustains the tax largely by distinguishing it
as a levy on "local activities" and hence not a tax on "the privilege
of doing interstate business in the State" which, it is conceded, may
not be imposed.44
But this in itself was insufficient to give the tax a clean bill of health
for local activity occurs in all interstate enterprises and a tax on "some
local event so much a part of interstate business as to be in effect a
tax upon the interstate business itself" was forbidden by Freeman v.
Hewit. The Justice was thus put to it to delineate the line between
taxable and non-taxable local activities which are at the same time
integral parts of interstate commerce. He did this by means of a two-
fold distinction. First, the multiple burden test with its correlative
requirement of apportionment was applied. Since the local activities
are those involved in the maintenance of the pipe line the tax is not an
unapportioned gross receipts tax on the commerce itself. It is appor-
tioned to the capital employed within the state, and "cannot be dupli-
cated in other states." The local incidents selected for taxation, there-
fore, cannot lend themselves to repeated exactions in other states.
Second, local maintenance activities "are events apart from the flow
of commerce" notwithstanding the admitted fact that "the interstate
commerce could not be conducted without" them. Thus it would appear
that the state may exact compensation for the protection it affords these
42 335 U. S. 80 (1948).
43 The majority opinion written by Justice Reed was concurred in by Justices Douglas
and Murphy. Justice Black concurred separately and silently. Justice Rutledge wrote a
concurring opinion. The dissenters spoke through Justice Frankfurter.
44 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. and its near antecedents con-
demned taxes which "impose a levy for the privilege of doing it [interstate commerce]."
309 U. S. 33, 48 (1940).
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local activities within its borders because they are sufficiently local to
avoid an "unreasonable burden . . . on the interstate business."4 5
Justice Rutledge was troubled by the "verbal formulae" of this
second point. He regarded the tax as substantially similar to the ap-
portioned tax on gross receipts from interstate transportation which the
Court had said New York could levy in Central Greyhound Lines v.
Mealey,46 and therefore upon the commerce itself-a deadly sin from
which the "verbal formulae" of the majority tried to rescue it in the
Natural Gas Co. case. Whether the tax was "upon" the commerce or
not did not offend Justice Rutledge, of course, so long as it was appor-
tioned in such a way as to preclude a multiple tax burden. In accordance
with the views he had expressed in the previous cases dealing with these
issues he was content to sustain this tax simply on the grounds that it
(1) did not operate extra-territorially, (2) did not discriminate against
interstate commerce by placing a greater burden on it than was placed
on competing intra-state commerce, (3) was duly apportioned so as
not to tax interstate activities carried on outside the state, (4) could
not be repeated by other states and therefore passed the multiple
burden test.
Although Justice Rutledge suggested that there was "little more than
a verbal difference" between himself and the majority in this case he
was concerned that the difference might assume controlling importance
in other cases. The difference was more than verbal as Justice Rut-
ledge's opinion reveals on its face. Accepting the well-established dogma
that a tax may not be imposed on the privilege of conducting an ex-
clusively interstate business or upon the business itself, the majority
is faced with a tax which it believes legitimate, but which clearly ap-
pears to violate one or both of these immunities. Considerable pains,
45 335 U. S. 80, 96 (1948).
46 334 U. S. 653 (1948). The case involved a New York state tax upon a carrier's
gross receipts applied to a bus route between two points in New York state, but with
a substantial portion of the route in two other states. The majority held that no con-
stitutional infirmity would exist if the tax were fairly apportioned to the mileage traveled
within the taxing state, but if it were unapportioned, the levy would unduly burden
interstate commerce. Since both appellant and appellee conceded that the tax statute
permitted such apportionment, the Court held that this was a matter for the New York
courts to determine. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result without comment-pre-
sumably in conformity with the views expressed in his concurring opinion in Freeman v.
Hewit. justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, dissenting, regarded the bus trip as local
commerce since its purpose was to provide transportation from one point to another
within the state. Passage through two other jurisdictions was therefore "a mere
geographic incident" in the consummation of the local transaction. Hence apportionment
was unnecessary.
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therefore, had to be taken to establish that it did neither. Hence the
verbalizing to which Justice Rutledge demurs. The multiple burden test
is employed by the majority largely to re-enforce the argument that
the taxed activities are in fact "apart from the flow of commerce" and
hence not really a part of interstate commerce at all, even though the
commerce could not be conducted without them! Strong adumbra-
tions, to say the least, of the subject matter test in "multiple-burden
clothing" are therefore manifest in this case. Justices Douglas and
Murphy subscribe to it despite their protestations in the Carter and
Weekes Stevedoring Co. case. In effect the majority opinion attempts a
kind of shot-gun wedding between the old subject-matter test and the
multiple-burden test, employing the latter to validate the identification
of a tax as not being laid "upon" interstate commerce. In short, a tax
is clearly not on interstate commerce if it does not create a multiple
burden. It was against this shot-gun wedding that Justice Rutledge
protested. He wanted neither the marriage nor any courting of the
old but presumably forsaken subject-matter test. The multiple burden
et al tests would not have proscribed a tax "upon" interstate com-
merce as such. He took pains to emphasize in his concurring opinion
that the incidence of the. tax in both this and the Central Greyhound
Lines case47 falls flatly on interstate commerce, albeit a local part of it.
But this is not controlling, he argues, if the test of constitutionality is
the multiple burden test and its corollaries rather than the subject mat-
ter test. Nor, of course, is the localness of the taxed activities. By this
line of reasoning Justice Rutledge developed the multiple burden test
beyond the position of its author, Justice Stone, to the point of repudi-
ating the view that the states may not tax the privilege of carrying on
an exclusively interstate business.48 The clear inference of his Memphis
Natural Gas case opinion is that a tax on the privilege of carrying on
an exclusively interstate business is valid provided it is properly ap-
portioned to the activities or the property within the taxing state.49
The prohibition on state taxation of the privilege of carrying on an ex-
clusively interstate business has reference to the subject matter of com-
merce. Since this prohibition was included in the multiple burden test
as it was developed by the Court after 1938, Justice Rutledge therefore
evolved a version of that test which has cleansed it of this vestigial
47 334 U. S. 653 (1948).
48 See note 8, supra.
49 Furthermore, in his concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, Justice Rutledge
made no reference to the invalidity of a tax on the privilege of engaging in an exclusively
interstate business.
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subject-matter overtone. Justice Rutledge's opinion alone in the Mem-
phis Natural Gas Co. case developed this view although Justice Black's
separate, silent concurrence in the judgment reflects his consistently ex-
pressed opinion that if Congress is silent, there is no constitutional
barrier to a non-discriminatory state tax on the privilege of carrying
on an exclusively interstate business. 50
In conformity with these views Justice Rutledge wrote the principal
opinion in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone" with the concurrence
of Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy. He asserted that a Mississippi
"privilege" tax measured by the gross receipts from the operation of a
pipeline wholly within the state was not void under the commerce clause
because it purported to impose a tax on the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce. The tax was valid because it met the essential
tests. It did not discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of
similar local commerce. The nature of the subject of taxation made ap-
portionment unnecessary. No multiple burden threatened, for no other
state could repeat the tax. And there was no attempt to tax interstate
activity carried on beyond Mississippi's jurisdiction. Only by Justice
Burton's concurrence with this judgment solely on the ground that the
tax was "on" the privilege of operating a pipeline in intrastate com-
merce was the tax saved.
Consistently with these views Justice Rutledge voted to strike down
a state tax only when it imposed or threatened a multiple burden,
discrimination, or extra-state incidence on interstate commerce. Hence
his vote against the tax in Freeman v. Hewit. Similarly in two other
significant cases he thought state taxing power exceeded permissible
limits.
Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota52 confronted the Court for the
first time with the question of state power to tax airplanes. Apparently
the case was a poser since there was a lapse of seven months between
argument in October, 1943, and the announcement of four separate
opinions on May 15, 1944. The majority opinion by Justice Frank-
furter upheld a Minnesota personal property tax on a fleet of planes
having home ports within other states. One or more of these other
states had apparently levied taxes on the company's planes. The argu-
GO See dissenting opinions of Justice Black in J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307, 321 (1938); Gwinn, White and Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 446
(1939).
51 93 L. Ed. 1163 (1949).
52 322 U. S. 292 (1944).
53 For a close analysis of precedent cases and the four opinions, see Note, 57 HAuv.
L. REv. 1097 (1943).
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ment hinged on the view that the tax situs of airplanes is the state of
domicile of the owner. Minnesota being the state of domicile of the
aircraft in question, its power to levy an unapportioned property tax
thereon, it was held, is not precluded by the commerce clause. Dis-
tinguishing the instrumentalities of land and air commerce, the majority
"refused to introduce a new doctrine of tax apportionment" in these
circumstances on the grounds that apportionment had heretofore applied
only to land commerce where some of the property had been con-
tinuously out of the domiciliary state for the tax year.5
Justice Rutledge, with Justices Roberts and Reed joined in a dis-
senting opinion written by Chief Justice Stone based on the multiple
burden test. Since the decision left other states free to impose com-
parable taxes on the same property used as an instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce which Minnesota had already taxed for the entire
year at its full value a "fatal economic burden" could be placed on
petitioners' planes. Thus Minnesota would be permitted to exceed
the limits of state taxing power as defined by the multiple burden
standard. To remedy this disability the dissenters favored apportion-
ment by means of appropriate tax ratios for states over which the
planes regularly flew with corresponding exemptions by the home state.
Thus for Justice Rutledge the constitutional basis for state taxation
of airplanes was their physical presence within the taxing state, not
the domicile of the owner. 5 From this followed the necessity for
apportionment in order to avoid multiple tax burdens.
54 The majority opinion relied heavily on N. Y. ex rel. New York Central and H. R. R.
Co. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1906), where a corporation was taxed on all its property
within the state during the tax year and none of which was continuously without the
state during the whole tax year and therefore had not acquired a tax situs elsewhere.
The majority also held inapplicable to the facts of the present case the doctrine of tax
apportionment for instrumentalities of interstate commerce introduced by Pullman's
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891), since that principle was based on
continuous protection by a state other than the domiciliary state throughout the tax
year.
Justice Jackson and justice Black each concurred in separate opinions, the former
because the majority "falls short of commitment that Minnesota's right is exclusive of
any similar right elsewhere." justice Black, on the contrary, added the reservation that
the decision should not be regarded as conclusive concerning the taxing powers of states
other than Minnesota. He reiterated his "leave it to Congress" position on these issues
expressed in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 183 (1940) (dissenting
opinion).
55 For this distinction the minority relied heavily on Union Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905), which distinguished between the basis of taxation
of chattels and intangibles. Since intangibles have no physical situs they can only be
reached through the domicile of the owner. Since airplanes are chattels, the minority
argued that the domicile rule does not apply. The Chief justice's opinion asserted fur-
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Writing the majority opinion in Nippert v. Richmond 6 Justice
Rutledge held that a fixed sum license tax imposed on a house to house
canvasser who solicits orders for goods to be shipped to the local
purchaser from another state discriminated against interstate com-
merce. Such a tax placed a heavier economic burden on the out-of-state
solicitor than on the local merchant. The argument hinged on the fixed
sum character of the tax which bore no relation to the volume of
business and was thus, in effect, unapportioned. This, Justice Rutledge
argued, clearly distinguished the tax from the New York sales tax
upheld in the Berwind-White case.57 Justice Douglas for the dissenters
commented: "The Court does not share the doubts which some of us
have had concerning the propriety of the judiciary acting to nullify
state legislation on the grounds that it burdens interstate commerce...
[more] Proof should le required to overcome the presumptive validity
of this ...legislation." 58
In both of these cases, as in Freeman v. Hewit, apportionment would
have saved the tax, in Justice Rutledge's view. Unapportioned, he
thought they exposed interstate commerce to the multiple burdens or
discrimination which the commerce clause forbids.
To sum up, Justice Rutledge was convinced that the multiple burden
test and its corollaries, including the discrimination rule, offered the
most practicable approach to balancing the counterthrusts of federalism
in the field of state taxation of interstate commerce. In this he followed
the rationale initially advanced by Justice Stone but with certain modifi-
cations. The concomitant doctrine that taxes may not be imposed on
ther that the Court misinterpreted the Miller case which applied to a situation where
itinerant freight cars had not moved regularly enough in any state outside the state of
domicile of the owner to acquire a tax situs there. This situation did not obtain in the
present case where the planes moved on a fixed route in accordance with a regular
schedule. Hence, according to the Union Refrigerator Transit Co. case the planes acquired
thereby a tax situs in other states.
56 327 U. S. 416 (1946).
57 And presumably also from the Arkansas sales which Justice Rutledge deemed per-
missible in McLeod v. Dilworth. The New York tax was levied on a percentage of gross
receipts, and the economic incidence of the tax fell only on completed transactions, not,
as in the present case, on the initial step toward bringing one about.
58 The minority, had they been more numerous, would have overruled or at least
qualified the long line of "drummer cases" to which the decision in this case adheres.
In law, a house to house canvasser when carrying goods with him for immediate de-
livery after sale is termed a peddler. When he solicits for subsequent interstate delivery
of the purchased goods he is termed a drummer and considered an instrument of inter-
state commerce, thus immune from state or municipal taxation according to the "drummer
cases." The rule was first laid down in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120
U. S. 489 (1886). See Note, 40 YALE L. J. 1094 (1931).
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the privilege of carrying on an exclusively interstate business, to which
the Court adhered during the evolution of the multiple burden test, he
repudiated as contradictory to the logic of the primary test. At the
same time he rigidly insisted that some kind of apportionment device
must be applied to any tax where risk, actual or potential, of a multiple
tax burden is present. As a refinement of the apportionment device he
proposed that the state of market be permitted to tax but not the state
of origin unless it allowed credit for any tax paid in the state of market.
This idea which he contributed to the subject involved a legislative
solution; it was not a judicial one. Because of this it is apparently
something of an anathema to Justice Frankfurter who eschews such
formulations in this field.
Further, Justice Rutledge was the leading advocate, after the death
of Chief Justice Stone, of the multiple burden doctrine. In the sense
of accepting it as his basic premise he was the sole consistent adherent
since the majority seems to have discarded it in Freeman v. Hewit and
the Stevedoring Co. case, and diluted it in the Memphis Natural Gas Co.
case, while Justices Black and Douglas rely primarily on the "leave it
to Congress" view. This is reinforced by the fact that in no case other
than those in which he wrote the majority opinion did he agree un-
reservedly with the Court's position.
Justice Rutledge accepted this compromise approach because he regard-
ed the issue of state taxation of interstate commerce as essentially a
problem of federalism for which the Court must perforce assume a share
of the responsibility.
That responsibility requires the Court to permit some leeway for
state taxing power over interstate commerce. He believed that the
multiple burden test was best fitted to accomplish this-best squared
with the design of the commerce clause because it contemplated only
the economic consequences of state taxation. It thus offered a modus
vivendi by which interstate commerce enjoys substantial immunities
without throttling state power.
Perhaps more than any of the other justices Rutledge was equally
sensitive to the need for protecting a continental economy from fragmen-
tation and to the need for protecting the powers of the states in meeting
their fiscal requirements. This is reflected in the accompanying chart.
Speaking for the Court in 1946 he said: "The versatility with which
argument inverts state and national power, each in alternation to ward
off the other's incidence, is . . . a recurring manifestation of the con-
tinuing necessity in our federal system for accommodating the two
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ALIGNMENTS OF JUSTICES ON STATE TAXATION OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE CASES, 1943-1949
RUTLEDGE RUTLEDGE FOR STATE AGAINST STATE
JUSTICE VOTED WITH VOTED AGAINST TAX TAX
No. of cases % No. of cases No. of cases % No. of cases
Black 10 71 4 13 93 1
Douglas 10 71 4 13 93 1
Murphy 10 71 4 13 93 1
Rutledge 9 64 5
Reed 11 79 3 6 43 8
Frankfurter 9 64 5 6 43 8
Burton 7 70 3 4 40 6
Jackson 6 43 8 3 21 11
Vinson 6 60 4 2 20 8
basic powers it comprehends." 59 In his lectures at the University of
Kansas he spoke of the commerce clause as a "Chapter in Democratic
Living," making "rmom for the continuing adjustment and readjustment
of federal-state relationships, without which no federal scheme could
long survive. . . . It [the commerce clause] is inherently a federal
device. And such a plan by its very division of powers creates a safe-
guard 'perhaps not otherwise attainable against wholly autocratic
action. '60
Thus he was unwilling to go as far as Chief Justice Vinson and
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton in protecting interstate com-
merce from state exactions. Hence also his exceptions to Justice Frank-
furter's and Justice Reed's views in Freeman v. Hewitand the
Memphis Natural Gas Co. case. Nor was he willing to accept the "leave
it to Congress" theory espoused by Justices Black and Douglas. In the
first place, Justice Rutledge may have been more worried about state
impediments to commerce than they. For "a balkanized America today
... would be unequal to maintaining our people... and by outlawing
the balkanizing power of the states, it [the commerce clause] has given
them the legal and economic foundations which have released their
native energies and abilities for the country's vast and rapid develop-
ment."'" In the second place, Justice Rutledge was less reluctant to
employ the power of the Courts to prevent state intrusions on this con-
tinental economy than his two brethren. Contrary to their general view
that this is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility, he asserted
that "Congress, the states, and the courts have all had important and
59 Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 412 (1946).
60 RunO=DGE, A DECLARATIOx or LEGAL FAITH1 72, 76 (1947).
61 Id. at 76.
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continuing parts in the regulation of the nation's commerce. They will
keep on doing so. That power, so distributed, has been a major protec-
tion to individual freedom from concentrated authority in any single
place over the lifeblood of the people, their commerce, their trade.""
Hence his agreement with the holding in Freeman v. Hewit and the
Memphis Natural Gas Co. case, and his proposal of a legislative formula
in the former. 3 In all of this, he quite candidly eschewed the pretenses
of mechanical jurisprudence. Here, as elsewhere, the ultimate factor
which governs choice lies in policy considerations rooted in the minds
of the Justices themselves. Thus he once remarked:
For cleanly as the commerce clause has worked affirmatively, its implied
operation on state power has been uneven, at times highly variable....
Into what is thus left open for inference to fill, divergent ideas of mean-
ing may be read much more readily -than into what has been made ex-
plicit by affirmation. That possibility is broadened immeasurably when
not logic alone, but large choices of policy, affected in this instance by
evolving experience of federalism, control in giving content to the implied
negation. 4
In exercising his own choice among policies Justice Rutledge employed
no conceptual device to determine the limits of state taxation of inter-
state commerce. Concrete economic consequences were for him determin-
ative. Hence his consistent adherence to the pragmatic multiple burden
test. No member of the present Court with the possible exception of
Justices Clark and Minton now subscribes to this yardstick, first
fashioned by Justice Stone and solely perpetuated from 1946 to 1949
by Justice Rutledge.
62 Id. at 76. Italics added.
63 Although on their voting record in these cases Justice Rutledge appears to have
been in agreement with Justice Frankfurter about two-thirds of the time this is deceptive
in the light of Justice Rutledge's vigorous disagreement with Justice Frankfurter's
grounds in Freeman v. Hewit. The same is true, to a lesser extent, with respect to Justice
Reed in the light of Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone. Insofar as one can indulge in
the risky game of classifying the justices on doctrinal grounds and voting records,
Justice Rutledge occupied a position between Justice Reed and Justices Douglas and
Black. This is dearly indicated in the voting records. It is also borne out by the
analysis of the opinions themselves.
64 Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 418 (1946). Italics added.
1950l
